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I. INTRODUCTION
Healthcare regulation is an important public issue due to the massive
expenditures that flow to the industry coupled with the sector’s perceived lack
of transparency.  In 2007, healthcare spending in the United States reached a
colossal $2.2 trillion, or 16.2% of the gross domestic product.1  This figure
amounted to a 6.1% increase in spending compared to 2006.2  In a time of
rising healthcare costs,3 many consumers are cynical about the industry’s regu-
latory and economic structures.  To be sure, physicians, corporations, insurance
companies, and other entities all make decisions that affect the quality, quan-
tity, and cost of patient care.  As consumers may not understand or be able to
control these costs, they understandably seek government intervention to pre-
vent wrongful conduct by the healthcare industry.
This predicament is visible in the context of pharmaceutical marketing.
Pharmaceutical corporations engage in several activities to promote their prod-
ucts.4  For example, in the practice known as “detailing,” pharmaceutical cor-
porations market directly to doctors through a professional sales force.5  The
purpose of detailing is to persuade physicians to prescribe more of a given
product to patients.6  Naturally, consumers worry that healthcare professionals
and pharmaceutical corporations may engage in conduct that influences physi-
cians to prescribe products that either cost more than equally effective generic
drug counterparts, or that are unnecessary for the patient.  Consequently, con-
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1 HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2007 HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2007),
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Amanda Gardner, U.S. Health-Care Costs to Top $4 Trillion by 2016, WASH. POST, Feb.
21, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/21/AR20070221
00524_pf.html.
4 See Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka, The Effects and Role of Direct-to-Physician
Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry:  An Integrative Review, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y
L. & ETHICS 785, 785-86 (2005).
5 See id.
6 See id. at 787.
209
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\10-1\NVJ108.txt unknown Seq: 2 16-MAR-10 7:17
210 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:209
sumers ask the government to intervene to resolve their concerns through
legislation.7
Legislation that circumscribes the marketing activities of corporations
forces these entities to develop more restrictive decision-making processes than
required under the classical and modern approaches to corporate governance.
The classical approach compels corporate directors and officers to take actions
to maximize shareholder profitability so long as the actions are lawful, “without
deception or collusion.”8  Modern constituency statutes, as adopted in several
states including Nevada, have modified the traditional approach to corporate
governance by allowing corporations to consider parties other than the share-
holders when making decisions.9  In the context of the pharmaceutical industry,
these other parties may include patients who use a corporation’s pharmaceutical
products.  Prior to 2007, Nevada law permitted corporations to consider the
interests of other constituencies so long as they acted in the best interest of the
corporation.10  Although this constituency standard departed from the classical
approach, corporations had no affirmative duty to act in the best interests of
other constituencies.11  In October 2007, however, the Nevada Legislature
mandated that pharmaceutical corporations act in a way that promotes the best
interests of the patient, thereby chipping away at corporate discretion.12
Although laudable, the wisdom of this legislation is suspect.
Accordingly, this Note focuses on an education-based alternative to pro-
mote effective interactions between pharmaceutical corporations and physi-
cians that benefit patients while allowing these corporations to exercise
business discretion.  Specifically, educational programs that teach physicians
how to interact with pharmaceutical corporations most effectively may maxi-
mize the benefits for all parties involved.  Although many of the arguments
presented may be extended to corporations that sell or market medical devices
or appliances, their application in that context is beyond the scope of this Note.
In Part II, this Note discusses the background of corporate decision-making and
its application in the pharmaceutical industry in Nevada.  Part III analyzes the
pertinent Nevada statutes, and how they apply in a practical context.  Then, in
Part IV, this Note offers alternative approaches to promote the best interests of
patients while maintaining corporate autonomy in decision-making functions.
Part V concludes with some final thoughts.
7 See, e.g., Minutes of the Meeting of the Assem. Comm. of Commerce and Labor:  Hearing
on Assem. B. 128, 74th Sess. 6 (Nev. 2007), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/
Minutes/Assembly/CMC/Final/465.pdf (statement of Diana M. Glomb-Rogan, representing
The League of Women Voters of Nevada) (stating in regard to legislation to restrict the
marketing efforts of drug companies that “it is good consumer protection legislation and an
important way to cut the cost of pharmaceuticals.  We urge passage of this bill.”).
8 Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globaliza-
tion, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 708 (2002).
9 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138 (2007).
10 See id.
11 See id.
12 NEV. REV. STAT. § 639.570 (2007).
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II. BACKGROUND OF CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING IN NEVADA’S
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
The pharmaceutical industry is important to our economy.  In the United
States, prescription drug expenditures equaled $227.5 billion in 2007,13 repre-
senting approximately ten percent of annual health care spending.14  To
increase revenues and maximize profits, pharmaceutical corporations engage in
substantial marketing activities,15 including:  giving samples to physicians,
placing advertisements in medical journals, and sponsoring physician meetings
and events.16  Moreover, pharmaceutical corporations subsidize the cost of con-
tinuing medical education programs that allow many healthcare professionals
to remain certified in their respective fields.17
In addition, professional sales representatives market directly to physi-
cians by engaging in face-to-face meetings,18 an activity known as “detail-
ing.”19  Pharmaceutical corporations spend between $12-$18 billion annually in
detailing and make approximately 60 million visits to healthcare professionals
per year.20  These activities are important to promote stockholder profitability,
and to create the revenues necessary to support technological improvements.
A. Impact of Detailing on Healthcare Professionals
Although physician attitudes toward pharmaceutical representatives are
mixed, their prescribing patterns appear to correlate with detailing efforts.21  A
wide group of studies demonstrates that physicians’ feelings about pharmaceu-
tical companies range from negative to neutral.22  This lukewarm attitude is
consistent with some of the reasons healthcare professionals report as to why
they interact with representatives, such as the desire to be polite, and pressure
to interact with the representatives who appear in person at their offices.23  Fur-
thermore, as members of a sales force, pharmaceutical representatives likely
carry many of the same negative inferences that attach to other sales profes-
sionals.  Generally, people perceive salespeople to be pushy, profit-obsessed,
and ambivalent to the needs of the client.
Despite these negative associations, healthcare professionals report that
pharmaceutical representatives do provide a useful service by conveying practi-
cal prescribing information for treating patients.24  One study indicated that
approximately seventy-one percent of third-year medical students believe that
materials dispersed by pharmaceutical corporations provide “a useful way to
13 HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 1, at 1.
14 See id.
15 Manchanda & Honka, supra note 4, at 785.
16 Id. at 785-86.
17 Mark R. Tonelli, Conflict of Interest in Clinical Practice, 132 CHEST 664, 667 (2007).
18 See Manchanda & Honka, supra note 4, at 785.
19 Id. at 785-86.
20 Frederick S. Sierles et al., Medical Students’ Exposure to and Attitudes About Drug Com-
pany Interactions:  A National Survey, 294 JAMA 1034, 1034 (2005).
21 Manchanda & Honka, supra note 4, at 787.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 790-91.
24 See id. at 793.
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learn about new drugs.”25  Pharmaceutical representatives continue to thrive
mainly because they provide information to healthcare professionals in an inex-
pensive and convenient manner.26  Consequently, effective healthcare profes-
sionals who know how to utilize these representatives as informational tools
may provide better service to their patients.
Regardless of physician attitudes or additional restrictive legislation, phar-
maceutical representatives will likely remain an integral part of the industry’s
marketing model because their efforts influence physicians to prescribe costly
products based on emotion rather than reason.27  Specifically, healthcare pro-
fessionals are more likely to prescribe irrationally due to their interaction with
pharmaceutical representatives.28  Furthermore, healthcare professionals are
more likely to prescribe fewer generic drugs and more costly drugs due to the
influence of pharmaceutical representatives.29
Several factors explain why pharmaceutical representatives affect pre-
scribing patterns.30  First, representatives give gifts and promotional material to
doctors, such as samples and informational resources, thereby creating an
expectation of reciprocity.31  Thus, physicians feel bound to prescribe a partic-
ular drug upon receiving samples from pharmaceutical representatives.32
Although healthcare professionals may be unaware of this effect, it nonetheless
exists.  Second, representatives use social validation claims to persuade doctors
to prescribe certain medications.33  This tactic utilizes the bandwagon effect to
influence prescription patterns.  Third, pharmaceutical representatives ask phy-
sicians to commit to prescribing certain drugs for their patients.34  Finally,
detailers utilize expert authority to motivate doctors to prescribe a medica-
tion.35  Although doctors receive benefits from detailing, they may become
subject to sales tactics that affect patients negatively.  These four factors create
major dilemmas for pharmaceutical marketing.
In an ideal world, doctors would prescribe medications based on objective
medical information as applied to a patient’s individual condition.  However,
several studies confirm that the world does not operate in an ideal setting.  In
one study, McKinney et al. observed physician attitudes regarding detailing
practices and potential ethical issues.36  These researchers found that many
physicians believe that the pharmaceutical industry’s gift-giving practices, such
as giving small trinkets, expensive meals, books, travel packages, or sham con-
sultancy fees to physicians, do not influence their prescribing decisions.37
However, these same physicians believe that they are less susceptible to the
25 Sierles, supra note 20, at 1036, 1037 fig.1.
26 Manchanda & Honka, supra note 4, at 787.
27 See id. at 788.
28 Sierles, supra note 20, at 1034-35.
29 Id.
30 See Manchanda & Honka, supra note 4, at 800.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Tonelli, supra note 17, at 666, 669 n.27.
37 Id.
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pressures associated with the gifts than their colleagues.38  This research sug-
gests that physicians underestimate their level of bias.  Additionally, another
study noted that expensive gifts lead to a greater potential for undue influ-
ence.39  According to the Aldir et al. study, which examined how physicians
perceive pharmaceutical company gifts, most doctors believe that gifts worth
over $100 are inappropriate.40  However, another author asserts that gifts of
any amount are inappropriate, and therefore physicians should not accept any
such gift.41
Notwithstanding the potential for undue influence that attaches to costly
gifts, health-care professionals believe that manipulative representatives are not
nearly as effective as those who take another approach.42  The Andaleeb and
Tallman study on physician attitudes concluded that health-care professionals
view a “manipulative and aggressive selling style” in a negative light.43  The
study also found that “[t]he more informational and educational [the] support
[provided by the] sales representatives and the higher the number of patients
[that a physician treats], the more favorable were physicians’ attitudes toward
sales representatives.”44  Nonetheless, profit incentives motivate pharmaceuti-
cal corporations to enlist a sales force to promote their products regardless of
any dilemma presented or the unpopularity of the sales force.  The question
then becomes the following:  what powers do these corporations have to pursue
profit motives, and should the government seek to restrain these powers?
B. The Background of Corporate Director and Officer Duties
Scholars, such as prominent law professors Adolf Berle and Merrick
Dodd, have debated the proper role of corporations in society since the 1930s.45
Specifically, Berle asserted that corporations owed a high duty to shareholders
because they are the owners of the business.46  Furthermore, Berle believed that
“managers as agents, or trustees . . . owed a fiduciary duty to the shareholders
to maximize shareholder profits.”47  Dodd, on the other hand, opined that cor-
porations should take into account the interests of shareholders, employees,
customers, and members of the public when making decisions.48
The shareholder-maximization model is rooted in a particular historical
perspective of corporate history.  At the end of the nineteenth century, accord-
ing to the “standard story” of corporate law academics, business began to
38 Id.
39 See Manchanda & Honka, supra note 4, at 791-92.
40 Id. at 792.
41 See generally Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts
to Physicians from Industry, 290 JAMA 252 (2003).
42 See Manchanda & Honka, supra note 4, at 793.
43 Id. at 793.
44 Id.
45 Martin L. Hirsch, Side Effects of Corporate Greed:  Pharmaceutical Companies Need a
Dose of Corporate Social Responsibility, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 607, 620 (2008).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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advance toward the modern construct of a corporation.49  Technological
advancements required tremendous capital contribution.50  Investors who were
willing to engage in such ventures sought to diversify their investments.51
Accordingly, the corporate form allowed each investor to own a small piece of
the enterprise and maintain a diversified portfolio.52  However, investors
tended to lack the necessary understanding and incentive to monitor corporate
directors and officers, thereby rendering these managers substantially free from
oversight.53  As a result, investors need a way to ensure that directors and
officers used investor capital wisely.  The shareholder-maximization approach
solved this problem by imposing a duty on directors and officers to promote
shareholder economic interests.54
The private nature of the corporation in the United States also explains the
development of the shareholder-maximization model.  Historically, American
academics have viewed corporations as private economic entities with strong
duties to their shareholders.55  Under this view, increasing shareholder wealth
benefits society on a macro-economic level because it benefits individual inves-
tors while promoting social objectives.  In particular, when corporations suc-
ceed at creating jobs and providing goods and services, they also benefit
society through paying taxes that disperse to society in general.56
Although this viewpoint encourages corporations to act in a selfish man-
ner, it does not propose that corporations operate without regulation.  The
profit-maximizing efforts of corporations still must comply with the law, “with-
out deception or collusion.”57  As the late Milton Friedman once noted, “[in a
free economy] there is one and only one social responsibility of business–to use
its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as
it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free
competition, without deception or fraud.”58
Although the classical theory of corporate decision-making has defined
the shape of corporations, the approach adopted by Dodd is making inroads.
Modern terminology exemplifies a dichotomy between the shareholder-ori-
ented model, as advocated by Berle, and the stakeholder model, as proposed by
Dodd.59  In modern terms, the stakeholder model of corporate decision-making
now allows corporations to address economic, environmental, and social inter-
ests as well as those of shareholders,60 while the shareholder model asks corpo-
49 Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the
United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1933 (1993).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Williams, supra note 8, at 712-13.
55 Id. at 708.
56 Id. at 714.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Hirsch, supra note 45, at 620-21.
60 Id. at 623.
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rations to operate within the confines of the law.  Several states, including
Nevada, have adapted to these competing views of corporate governance.61
C. Corporate Governance in Nevada
Nevada allows corporations to operate under either the shareholder-ori-
ented approach or the stakeholder approach.  Nevada Revised Statutes (“NRS”)
section 78.138 states, “Directors and officers shall exercise their powers in
good faith and with a view to the interests of the corporation.”62  Thus, the key
issue revolves around what the interests of the corporation may be.  Section 4
of the statute states:
Directors and officers, in exercising their respective powers with a view to the inter-
ests of the corporation, may consider:
(a)  The interests of the corporation’s employees, suppliers, creditors and
customers;
(b)  The economy of the State and Nation;
(c)  The interests of the community and of society; and
(d)  The long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its
stockholders, including the possibility that these interests may be best served by
the continued independence of the corporation.63
Finally, the statute remarks, “Directors and officers are not required to consider
the effect of a proposed corporate action upon any particular group having an
interest in the corporation as a dominant factor.”64  Thus, the statute allows
corporate officers and directors the discretion to pursue the interests of the cor-
poration.  The term “may consider”65 is indicative that the directors or officers
may comply with either the stakeholder approach or the shareholder model.
D. A More Constrictive Model for Pharmaceutical Marketing
Although NRS section 78.138 governs corporate governance in Nevada,
the State Legislature has created a less-flexible standard for pharmaceutical
marketing in light of social and economic pressures.66  Conflicts arise from the
relationship among pharmaceutical corporations, physicians, and the public.67
There is a growing concern that doctors may over-prescribe medications to
patients because of their interaction with these companies.68  Rising prescrip-
tion costs have raised worries over the role that pharmaceutical companies play
in this ubiquitous phenomenon.69  Furthermore, there are ethical implications
61 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138 (2007).
62 Id. § 78.138(1).
63 Id. § 78.138(4).
64 Id. § 78.138(5).
65 Id. § 78.138(4).
66 See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
67 See supra Part II.A.
68 See Dan Stockman & Michael Schroeder, Rx For Pain, J. GAZETTE (Fort Wayne, Ind.),
December 28, 2008, http://www.journalgazette.net/apps/pbcs/dll/article?AID=/20081228/
LOCAL10/81228030 (reporting that Purdue Pharmaceuticals recently paid $19.5 million in
settlements due to allegations that it asked doctors to recommend overly-aggressive medica-
tion schedules for patients).
69 See Minutes of the Meeting of the Assem. Comm. of Commerce and Labor:  Hearing on
Assem. B. 128, supra note 7, at 6 (statement of Jon L. Sasser).
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regarding the business of pharmaceutical marketing.  According to statistics
presented to the Nevada Assembly, pharmaceutical corporations spend ninety
percent of marketing dollars on physicians,70 a figure suggesting an undue
influence on physicians.  Although the Assembly later learned that pharmaceu-
tical corporations spend a majority of those marketing dollars on samples that
physicians give to their patients,71 the Assembly nonetheless sought to pass a
bill that would lead to the imposition of additional, and potentially onerous,
duties on corporations that market pharmaceuticals to doctors.72
Before 2007, the main requirement for pharmaceutical corporations oper-
ating in Nevada was to obtain a state license to distribute pharmaceutical
drugs.73  In most other respects, the State regulated pharmaceutical marketing
without enforcing industry-specific requirements.  Thus, NRS section 78.138
governed pharmaceutical corporations operating in Nevada.74
In 2004, however, California adopted legislation to regulate pharmaceuti-
cal marketing.75  Subsequently, Nevada modeled its pharmaceutical marketing
legislation on the California statute.  In pertinent part, the California legislation
states:
(a) Every pharmaceutical company shall adopt a Comprehensive Compliance Pro-
gram that is in accordance with the April 2003 publication “Compliance Program
Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers,” which was developed by the United
States Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General . . . .
(b) Every pharmaceutical company shall include in its Comprehensive Compliance
Program policies for compliance with the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufactur-
ers of America (PhRMA) “Code on Interactions with Health Care Professionals,”
dated July 1, 2002.  The pharmaceutical company shall make conforming changes to
its Comprehensive Compliance Program within six months of any update or revision
of the “Code on Interactions with Health Care Professionals.”76
The code further mandates that pharmaceutical companies establish monetary
limits on “gifts, promotional materials, or items or activities” provided to
healthcare professionals in compliance with the two publications mentioned in
sections (a) and (b) of the legislation.77  However, the code specifically
exempts drug samples, “financial support for continuing medical education
forums, and financial support for health educational scholarships” from these
limitations.78  Furthermore, in California, pharmaceutical corporations can
make payments to physicians for “legitimate professional services.”79
The reasons for adopting rigorous regulation of the pharmaceutical indus-
try are intimated in the Legislative Counsel’s Digest.80  Specifically, the Cali-
70 Id. at 4 (statement of Assemb. Heidi S. Gansert).
71 Id. at 9 (statement of Jim Morgan) (stating that sixty-three percent of pharmaceutical
corporation marketing dollars pay for samples that physicians give to patients).
72 See id. at 3.
73 NEV. REV. STAT. § 639.233 (2007).
74 See id. § 78.138.
75 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 119402 (2007).
76 Id. § 119402 (a)-(b).
77 Id. § 119402 (d)(1).
78 Id. § 119402 (d)(2).
79 Id. § 119402 (d)(3).
80 See S. 1765, 2003-04 Sess. (Cal. 2004).
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fornia Legislature concurred with the position of the Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) that, “‘[w]e are . . . concerned that
our interactions with healthcare professionals not be perceived as inappropriate
by patients or the public at large.’”81  Moreover, the Legislature also agreed
with the Office of the Inspector General’s position that “‘[a] comprehensive
compliance program provides a mechanism that addresses the public and pri-
vate sectors’ mutual goals of reducing fraud and abuse; enhancing health care
provider operational functions; improving the quality of health care services;
and reducing the cost of health care.’”82  Being sensitive to societal pressures,
the California Legislature sought to enact legislation that the public would per-
ceive as a remedy to illegitimate business practices between pharmaceutical
corporations and healthcare professionals.
E. Pharmaceutical Marketing Regulation Comes to Nevada
The Nevada Legislature followed California’s example by enacting a stat-
ute to regulate pharmaceutical marketing to healthcare professionals.  Previ-
ously, the Legislature attempted to enact a regulation package with Assembly
Bill 66, but failed to garner enough support for passage.83  Assembly Bill 66
sought to codify the PhRMA standards as well as those of the American Medi-
cal Association in order to regulate how pharmaceutical companies provided
information to doctors.84  To revive this attempt at regulation, the Legislature
presented Assembly Bill 128 in February of 2007 as “the next generation of
drug detailing legislation.”85  After conducting some revisions, the Nevada
Assembly and Senate passed the bill in May 2007.86  Thereafter, Governor Jim
Gibbons signed the bill into law in June 2007.87
The Legislature confronted several tensions as it made changes to the pro-
posed bill.  Early versions of the bill demonstrated the Legislature’s concern
that economic incentives from pharmaceutical corporations may influence pre-
scribing patterns.88  For example, one version stated that gifts with “no direct
benefit to a patient” that exceed $100 should be reported by the manufacturer
or wholesaler.89  In addition, the earlier bill sought to force pharmaceutical
corporations to report the names of physicians and other individuals who
received gifts in the aggregate of more than $1000 during a reporting period.90
Similar to the California legislation, the early version of the bill exempted sam-
ples, scholarships, and reasonable compensation for physician services from
81 Id. § 1(c).
82 Id. § 1(d).
83 See Minutes of the Meeting of the Assem. Comm. of Commerce and Labor:  Hearing on
Assem. B. 128, supra note 7, at 3 (statement of Assemb. Marcus Conklin).
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Nev. Legis. Counsel Bureau, AB 128, http://www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/reports/his-
tory.cfm?id=309 (last visited Sept. 10, 2009).
87 Id.
88 See Assem.128 § 1, 2007 Leg., 74th Sess. (Nev. 2007) (Assem. Amendment 140).
89 See id. § 1(1)(b)-(c).
90 See id. § 1(2)(a)(1).
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that amount.91  Furthermore, the Legislature was not concerned with gifts with
a value less than $100.92
As the bill progressed through the legislative process, its language loos-
ened considerably.  Indeed, during an early hearing in the Assembly, Assem-
blyman Conklin stated:
The California statute as I read it is looser than this.  It requires the pharmaceutical
companies only to have a positive affirmation that they have a policy in place to deal
specifically with this issue.  There is no reporting mechanism other than the pharma-
ceutical company has to put some affirmation of that policy on its website.93
After the Legislature revised the bill and before it passed the proposal into
law, Assemblyman Conklin stated that, “[t]he bill before you now is a compro-
mise bill that probably makes no one happy, but makes no one unhappy.”94
Echoing this statement, Barry Gold, the Director of Government Relations for
AARP, Nevada, stated, “[t]his bill is a compromise representing a step in pro-
viding the public with knowledge that their pharmaceutical industry has a code
of conduct and their accountability to that code of conduct and provides infor-
mation on their compliance.”95  These statements suggest that the purpose of
the bill was to provide a mechanism to improve transparency between pharma-
ceutical corporations and the public.
F. The Nevada Statute—NRS Section 639.570
The Legislature codified the end product of Assembly Bill 128 as NRS
section 639.570, which became effective on October 1, 2007.  The first section
states:
A wholesaler or manufacturer who employees a person to sell or market a drug,
medicine, chemical, device or appliance in this State shall:
(a)  Adopt a written marketing code of conduct which establishes the practices
and standards that govern the marketing and sale of its products.  The marketing code
of conduct must be based on applicable legal standards and incorporate principles of
health care, including, without limitation, requirements that the activities of the
wholesaler or manufacturer be intended to benefit patients, enhance the practice of
medicine and not interfere with the independent judgment of health care
professionals.96
The first requirement of the statute states that pharmaceutical corporations
must adopt a “marketing code of conduct.”97  NRS section 639.570 provides
91 See id. § 1(2)(b).
92 See id. § 1.
93 Minutes of the Meeting of the Assem. Comm. of Commerce and Labor:  Hearing on
Assem. B. 128, supra note 7, at 5 (statement of Assemb. Marcus Conklin).
94 Minutes of the S. Comm. of Commerce and Labor:  Hearing on Assem. B. 128, 74th Sess.
6 (Nev. 2007), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/Minutes/Senate/CL/Final/
1392.pdf (statement of Assemb. Marcus Conklin).
95 Id. (statement of Barry Gold).
96 NEV. REV. STAT. § 639.570(1)(a) (2007).  Some requirements of the statute will receive
little attention because they are beyond the scope of this Note.  They include requirements
for annual audits to monitor compliance, identifying a compliance officer, submissions to the
State Board of Pharmacy, and the requirement to “[a]dopt policies and procedures for inves-
tigating instances of noncompliance with the marketing code of conduct . . . .” Id. at
§ 639.570(1)(c)-(e).
97 Id.
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pharmaceutical corporations with the option of developing their own codes of
conduct or adapting an existing code.98  However, the law provides minimal
guidance, and gives no measurable standard to corporations that wish to create
their own codes of conduct.99
Instead, NRS section 639.570 merely references a code of conduct that
meets the Legislature’s approval.100  In pertinent part, the statute states, “Adop-
tion of the most recent version of the Code on Interactions with Healthcare
Professionals developed by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America satisfies the requirements . . . .”101  As with the California pharmaceu-
tical marketing statute, the Nevada statute approves the use of the PhRMA
code.  The PhRMA code represents a voluntary compliance program intended
to improve interactions between pharmaceutical representatives and healthcare
professionals, and to improve the public’s perception of the industry.102
Although the PhRMA measures were previously voluntary, the PhRMA mea-
sures (or other regulations that comply with the statute) became mandatory for
pharmaceutical corporations with the passage of NRS section 639.570.
The purpose of the code of conduct requirement is to establish standards
and principles to regulate pharmaceutical corporations.103  According to the
statute, pharmaceutical corporations must take actions that are “intended to
benefit patients, enhance the practice of medicine and not interfere with the
independent judgment of health care professionals.”104  Once the code of con-
duct is in place, the statute instructs that pharmaceutical corporations must
“[a]dopt a training program to provide regular training to appropriate employ-
ees, including, without limitation, all sales and marketing staff, on the market-
ing code of conduct.”105  The Legislature surely intended to ensure that
pharmaceutical corporations paid more than lip service to this statutory enact-
ment by imposing statutory requirements on company infrastructure.  However,
as the next section discusses, the Legislature’s lack of regulatory direction
leaves pharmaceutical corporations with no clear standards, and consequently
with no indication as to whether liability will attach to their actions.  Further-
more, pharmaceutical corporations may experience increased costs without
conveying any clear benefit to patients or the public.
This Note will analyze corporate governance under this statute as if phar-
maceutical corporations have adopted the PhRMA code.  As the Legislature has
specifically mentioned that the PhRMA code is compliant with the statute, the
Legislature evidently agreed with the principles and regulations contained
therein.106  According to the PhRMA code, its purposes are several fold.  First,
the legislature, the public, pharmaceutical corporations, doctors, and patients
98 See id. at § 639.570(1)(a).
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 Id.
102 See PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTHCARE
PROFESSIONALS 2 (2008), available at http://www.phrma.org/files/PhRMA%20Marketing
%20Code%202008.pdf.
103 NEV. REV. STAT. § 639.570(1)(a).
104 Id.
105 Id. § 639.570(1)(b).
106 See id. § 639.570(1)(a).
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desire positive interactions between pharmaceutical corporations and physi-
cians.107  Specifically, the PhRMA code states, “Ethical relationships with
healthcare professionals are critical to our mission of helping patients by devel-
oping and marketing new medicines.”108  The question then becomes one of
perceptions:  What creates an ethical relationship?  According to the PhRMA
code, “[a]n important part of achieving this mission is ensuring that healthcare
professionals have the latest, most accurate information available regarding
prescription medicines, which play an ever-increasing role in patient health-
care.”109  Thus, ethical relationships consist of providing value-adding informa-
tion to assist doctors in making prescription decisions.
Second, the PhRMA code seeks to enable doctors to do that which is best
for their patients.  In particular, the PhRMA code states, “[A] healthcare profes-
sional’s care of patients should be based, and should be perceived as being
based, solely on each patient’s medical needs and the healthcare professional’s
medical knowledge and experience.”110  To this end, the pharmaceutical repre-
sentative should “inform healthcare professionals about the benefits and risks
of . . . products to help advance appropriate patient use, provide scientific and
educational information, support medical research and education, and obtain
feedback and advice about . . . products through consultation with medical
experts.”111
Additionally, the PhRMA code controls specific activities between physi-
cians and pharmaceutical companies.  The code governs the following:  meals,
entertainment and recreation, pharmaceutical corporate support of continuing
medical education, pharmaceutical corporate support for third-party educational
or professional meetings, doctors as consultants, speaker programs, educational
items that pharmaceutical corporations give to physicians, prescriber data, gui-
dance regarding physician decision-making, and training of pharmaceutical
corporate representatives.112
III. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF NRS SECTION 639.570
At first blush, the new duties encapsulated in NRS section 639.570 do not
appear alarming.  The PhRMA code denotes that pharmaceutical corporations
should provide services to healthcare professionals to help patients.113  How-
ever, this language codifies the duties of pharmaceutical companies regarding
their corporate governance.  Whereas previously the directors and officers of
corporations could take one or many factors into account when making corpo-
rate decisions, they must now consider the interests of patients and the judg-
ment of doctors.  Although the language may have been a benign and symbolic
gesture aimed at appeasing a hostile constituency, it creates a possible conflict
of interest for pharmaceutical companies that customarily made decisions
107 PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 102, at 2-3.
108 See id. at 2.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. (bullets omitted).
112 See generally id.
113 See id. at 2.
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purely according to the best interests of their shareholders.  Consequently, there
are several perils that accompany this new statutory position.
The implementation of NRS section 639.570 presents a potential conflict
for pharmaceutical companies that seek to pursue maximum profits for their
shareholders, an activity that the Legislature allows under Nevada’s corporate
governance statute.114  Under a shareholder-oriented model, pharmaceutical
companies have a duty to maximize investor profits.  Although many modern
statutes allow corporations to take actions with other interests in mind in addi-
tion to shareholder profits, the Nevada pharmaceutical marketing statute drasti-
cally reduces the ability of pharmaceutical companies to operate solely to
maximize investor returns.115  First, this Note will analyze how the general rule
of corporate governance in Nevada would apply in this situation, and how NRS
section 639.570 creates a conflict.  Next, this Note will discuss efficiency con-
siderations that lead to the conclusion that the law should revert to the general
corporate governance rule.
A. Benefit of Discretion for Corporate Directors and Officers
Pharmaceutical companies operate on behalf of individual investors who
expect corporate directors and officers to do everything in their power to pro-
duce a good return on their investment.  Common investors lack the “informa-
tion, skill, and incentive to monitor managers” to ensure that this wish is
carried out.116  Consequently, it makes sense to allow officers and directors to
act in a way that benefits those who provide the capital needed to carry out an
enterprise.
The general rule in Nevada corporate governance law allows a corporation
to focus on the interests of its shareholders.117  To be sure, directors and
officers can consider other factors when making corporate decisions.  Specifi-
cally, the statute allows directors and officers to consider the interests of
employees, suppliers, creditors, customers, the economy, and the interests of
community and of society.118  However, the statute also allows directors and
officers to serve the interests of its stockholders.119  Consequently, the pharma-
ceutical corporation that wishes to maximize return for its shareholders would
be able to do so without reserve if the general Nevada statute were to govern its
activities.
A hypothetical provides an example of the full implications of this general
rule.  For example, suppose that a pharmaceutical company wishes to maximize
shareholder profits.  This corporation would likely enlist a sales force to engage
in detailing to provide information to physicians due to the positive correlation
between detailing efforts and product prescriptions.120  Hence, the corporation
would likely engage in detailing for the primary purpose of persuading doctors
to prescribe its product because it is a profit-oriented corporation that is
114 See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78.138, 639.570 (2007).
115 See id.
116 Roe, supra note 49, at 1933.
117 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See Manchanda & Honka, supra note 4, at 787.
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accountable to its shareholders.  Likewise, the shareholders purchase stock in
the corporation with the hope of a return on their investment.  If they did not
think that the corporation would provide a healthy return, they probably would
have invested in another corporation.
Accordingly, the relationship between the corporation and its shareholders
places pressure on the directors and officers to provide infrastructure that maxi-
mizes shareholder returns.  If the corporation wishes to engage in detailing
efforts in Nevada under NRS section 78.138, then it may consider “[t]he long-
term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its stockholders.”121
This corporation could thus engage in profit-seeking behavior for the benefit of
its shareholders.
Likewise, if the corporation believed that it was in its best interest to pur-
sue another goal due to societal influence or shareholder preferences, it would
be able to pursue such a goal under NRS section 78.138.  The corporation could
alter its detailing efforts to best suit “[t]he interests of the community and of
society” if it so desired.122  For example, if the corporation were to receive
backlash from concerned shareholders or the public about unethical marketing
practices, the corporation could voluntarily change its marketing program and
advertise these changes.  Perhaps the corporation could gain a competitive
advantage against other pharmaceutical corporations by engaging in such a
campaign.
This does not mean, however, that the corporation is free from regulation.
In particular, NRS section 78.138 states, “Directors and officers shall exercise
their powers in good faith and with a view to the interests of the corpora-
tion.”123  Furthermore, directors and officers are individually liable for actions
if it is proven that:  “(a) His act or failure to act constituted a breach of his
fiduciary duties as a director or officer; and (b) His breach of those duties
involved intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of law.”124  Con-
sequently, a corporation cannot knowingly market an unsafe drug, give patently
false information to physicians regarding a drug, or engage in any other fraudu-
lent or illegal activity.  As such, the law prior to the enactment of NRS section
639.570 provided sufficient safeguards to prevent misuse of corporate power,
while at the same time allowing business to pursue the most efficient marketing
practices.
B. The Effect of NRS Section 639.570
The enactment of NRS section 639.570 creates a different dynamic for
pharmaceutical companies.  Specifically, the voluntary aspect of programs to
benefit interests outside of the corporation becomes mandatory.  In adopting a
marketing code of conduct, a pharmaceutical company must now base accept-
able activities on the requirement “that the activities . . . be intended to benefit
patients, enhance the practice of medicine and not interfere with the indepen-
121 NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(4)(d).
122 Id. § 78.138(4)(c).
123 Id. § 78.138(1).
124 Id. § 78.138(7).
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dent judgment of healthcare professionals.”125  Most people would agree that
these goals are laudable.  However, the language has a legal significance that
reduces the discretion of pharmaceutical corporations.
The requirement that corporations must “intend[ ] to benefit patients”126
forces corporations that solely seek to maximize shareholder returns to make
marketing decisions based on benefits to patients.  Corporations may try to
maneuver around the system to avoid compliance.  Conversely, the corpora-
tions may comply with the system and risk facing increased marketing compli-
ance costs.
1. Adoption of a Code that “Satisfies this Requirement”
One of the most precarious aspects of NRS section 639.570 is that there is
no clear standard to guide pharmaceutical corporations.  The statement that
“[t]he marketing code of conduct must be based on applicable legal standards
and incorporate principles of healthcare, including, without limitation, require-
ments that the activities of the wholesaler or manufacturer be intended to bene-
fit patients, enhance the practice of medicine and not interfere with the
independent judgment of healthcare professionals”127 is of little assistance.
Pharmaceutical companies were already required to comply with applicable
legal standards because compliance with the law is obviously a requisite to
operating a business.  Regarding principles of healthcare, the statute offers a
generic standard that the code “be intended to benefit patients, enhance the
practice of medicine and not interfere with the independent judgment of health
care professionals.”128  However, the statute offers minimal indication of how
these additional duties apply to pharmaceutical corporations.
In fact, the only guidance the statute gives regarding this standard is that
the PhRMA code satisfies the statutory requirements.129  Although there is no
indication that the PhRMA code is the only standard that meets the statutory
requirements, there is little indication of an alternative standard that would
definitively meet the requirements.130  Moreover, the Nevada Administrative
Code (“NAC”) provides little assistance.  According to the NAC, a pharmaceu-
tical wholesaler or manufacturer must indicate one of the following:  (1) that it
uses the PhRMA code without modification; (2) that it uses a modified version
of the PhRMA code; or that (3) it uses its own marketing code of conduct.131  If
the wholesaler or manufacturer creates its own code, it must demonstrate to the
Board of Pharmacy that it has addressed nine vague topics in a sufficient man-
ner.132  Failure to address these topics adequately will cause the code of con-
duct to be “incomplete” and “noncompliant.”133  Certainly, the Board of
Pharmacy will instruct a corporation as to how it may fix any deficiency that
125 NEV. REV. STAT. § 639.570(1)(a) (2007).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See id.
131 NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 639.616(1)-(3), 639.6053(1)-(3) (2007).
132 NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 639.616(3)-(4), 639.6053(3)-(4).
133 NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 639.616(5), 639.6053(5).
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the Pharmacy Board perceives.134  However, the State appears somewhat disin-
genuous in this effort, as it purports to allow corporations to create subjective
and flexible codes of conduct while imposing a duty to patients that must, as a
matter of effective jurisprudence, have an objective standard.  As the State’s
procedure does not offer constructive guidelines to help corporations create a
suitable code of conduct that meets an objective standard, it should be viewed
with caution.
The only suitable standard that the State has offered is that of the PhRMA
code.  Pharmaceutical corporations are forced to apply the PhRMA code, or
venture into unknown territory and potentially risk future liability by creating
an original code.  As there is no Nevada case law on the subject, a corporation
would take a risk if it created an original code, even if it had the assistance of
an administrative agency.  Some may argue that the lack of guidance actually
benefits pharmaceutical corporations as it allows them to determine their own
standards with minimal government interference.  However, by enacting a law
that creates a new duty for pharmaceutical corporations without offering spe-
cific guidance regarding the application of that duty, the Nevada State Legisla-
ture may be forcing pharmaceutical corporations to spend money in an
inefficient manner to avoid the specter of liability.
To apply the implications of this new statute, the aforementioned hypo-
thetical pharmaceutical corporation exemplifies the statutory impact.  Before
the Legislature enacted the statute, the hypothetical corporation may have taken
actions that complied with the law and were intended to maximize shareholder
profits.  After the state enacted the statute requiring a marketing code of con-
duct, the corporation may take the safest route and enact the PhRMA code.
As a result, the corporation now has the burden of setting up internal infra-
structure to regulate its marketing activities.135  Therefore, the corporation must
ensure that meals provided to healthcare professionals abide by certain guide-
lines.136  The corporation must regulate its gifts of entertainment and recrea-
tional items,137 its continuing medical education program,138 the manner in
which the corporation provides financial support for educational and profes-
sional meetings,139 and the manner in which the corporation interacts with
medical consultants and speakers.140  The corporation must worry about regula-
tions regarding physician disclosures,141 and scholarships and educational
funds.142  The corporation must also abstain from giving non-educational items
to healthcare professionals,143 and must restrict gifts of educational items.144
These additional duties and consequent regulations place an additional cost on
134 NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 639.619(2)-(3), 639.6057(2)-(3) (2007).
135 See generally PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 102.
136 See id. at 4.
137 See id. at 5.
138 See id. at 6.
139 See id. at 7.
140 See id. at 7-10.
141 See id. at 11.
142 See id. at 11.
143 See id.
144 See id. at 12.
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pharmaceutical companies to ensure compliance.  As a result, the Nevada State
Legislature has reduced the corporation’s motivation to maximize its profits.
Drawing back from the hypothetical, it is clear that corporations may
become responsible to third parties by mandate.145  However, the context of
this application is important.  Specifically, because the pharmaceutical industry
is like no other industry, it should not be subject to the same kind of controls
that one would ordinarily find in such areas as consumer protection.  First, soci-
ety charges pharmaceutical corporations with an important social goal to create
new medicines to cure illnesses.  By engaging in profit-maximizing behavior,
these corporations are able to fund new technologies to create new medicines.
Second, healthcare professionals already have a high duty to treat their patients
properly.  Thus, individuals are already in place to protect patients in case the
pharmaceutical industry becomes too greedy.  Moreover, the proposition that
the industry must put aside its focus on profit maximization simply to assuage
worries about healthcare professionals who have the highest duty to their
patients is insulting to physicians and to the traditional practice of corporate
law.  Third, the similarity of many drugs prompts directors and officers to use a
sales force to gain a comparative advantage over other pharmaceutical corpora-
tions.  Few people condone the lavish gifts that are impermissible under the
code.146  However, the heightened potential for a statutory violation may cause
corporate directors and officers to scale back their operations even further out
of fear.
2. Efficiency Concerns with NRS Section 639.570
One of the main concerns that NRS section 639.570 seeks to combat is
increasing prices for pharmaceuticals.  In theory, the statute limits a pharma-
ceutical corporation’s ability to influence a physician’s prescription patterns
toward higher priced brand-name drugs.  Notably, a representative of the
AARP stated, “If [pharmaceutical companies] set a goal to increase sales for a
particular drug, one way is through their drug representatives who visit physi-
cian’s [sic] offices on a regular basis.  The pharmaceutical companies provide
the doctors’ offices with many promotional items which provide a constant
reminder of their products.”147  Thus, the corporations’ tactic is to inundate the
doctors with items in such a way that sales for the drugs will increase.  It is
logical to think that reducing the influence of pharmaceutical corporations
would cause doctors to prescribe less costly drugs.  As a representative of the
League of Women Voters noted, “[I]t is good consumer protection legislation
and an important way to cut the cost of pharmaceuticals.”148
However, the benefit to patients is unclear.  In fact, Michael Karagiozis, a
doctor in Las Vegas, noted that “[i]f 2 percent of all prescriptions were moved
to generic by this legislation, the insurance companies in southern Nevada
would save $37 million off their pharmacy budget in the first year.  This bill
145 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 639.570 (2007); see also supra Part II.D.
146 See Manchanda & Honka, supra note 4, at 791-92.
147 Minutes of the Meeting of the Assem. Comm. of Commerce and Labor:  Hearing on
Assem. B. 128, supra note 7, at 6 (statement of Janet Cottrell, Volunteer, AARP, Nevada).
148 Id. at 6 (statement of Diana M. Glomb-Rogan, representing The League of Women
Voters of Nevada).
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does not benefit physicians or patients as much as it does insurance compa-
nies.”149  Furthermore, if patients were to move to generic drugs without a
substantial reduction in their out-of-pocket prescription costs, then the patients
would additionally suffer on the back-end from the lack of technological inno-
vation that would have come from pharmaceutical companies investing their
profits into research and development.  Consequently, patients will not receive
the aid of new medicines as quickly because pharmaceutical companies lost
some discretion in establishing their business practices.
The benefits of the legislation face other shortcomings.  Although detail-
ing is a costly endeavor, sixty-three percent of pharmaceutical marketing costs
come from samples that healthcare professionals give to patients.150  Thus,
patients benefit directly from detailing efforts.  Furthermore, as stated in IMS
Health Inc. v. Ayotte,151 the benefits of generic drugs to patients are not as high
as one might think.  First, generic drugs are not subject to the same study and
testing standards as name-brand drugs.152  Second, the absorption rates of a
generic drug versus a name-brand drug may be different, thereby causing
potential adverse reactions when switching.153
As the efficiency of NRS section 639.570 is debatable, there is no need to
alter the corporate decision-making structure, particularly one that alienates
directors and officers from their duties to shareholders.  The benefits of chang-
ing the system do not outweigh the costs because the potential benefits from the
change are uncertain.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
The solutions to the problem caused by the negative perceptions of phar-
maceutical corporations and NRS section 639.570 can be resolved by:  (1)
reverting back to the former corporate governance statute; and (2) focusing on
physician education.  First, the Legislature could allow NRS section 78.138 to
form the standard for pharmaceutical corporate governance.  In this way, share-
holders may hold directors and officers to the fiduciary duties that prevail in the
majority of the corporate world.  Furthermore, pharmaceutical corporations
would have more discretion to engage in actions that lead to healthy business
returns and improved medications for patients in the future.
Second, instead of regulating representative interactions with doctors, the
State should focus on teaching physicians how to use the pharmaceutical indus-
try’s marketing tools to their patients’ advantage.  As physicians have a height-
ened duty to act in the best interests of their patients, they should be the focus
of educational improvements in this area.  Up to ninety percent of doctors
believe they have not received enough training in working with pharmaceutical
representatives.154  Thus, although healthcare professionals believe that the
149 Id. at 9 (statement of Michael Karagiozis).
150 Id. (statement of Jim Morgan, representing PhRMA).
151 IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F.Supp. 2d 163 (D.N.H. 2007).
152 Id. at 169 n.5.
153 Id.
154 Michael A. Steinman, Gifts to Physicians in the Consumer Marketing Era, 284 JAMA
2243, 2243 (2000).
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pharmaceutical industry provides helpful information regarding prescription
decisions,155 these professionals are subject to a potentially negative influence.
One way to promote the best interests of patients is to educate healthcare
professionals on how to obtain helpful information from pharmaceutical repre-
sentatives without sacrificing objectivity.  A focus on education would lead to
greater efficiency as doctors would know how to get useful information from
pharmaceutical corporations without becoming subject to negative prescription
patterns.  As one author noted, physician education could focus on the follow-
ing questions:  (1) “What Would My Patients Think about This Arrange-
ment?”156 (2) “What Is the Purpose of the Industry Offer?”157 (3) “What
Would My Colleagues Think about This Arrangement?”158  These are merely
suggestions to help healthcare professionals properly manage their relationships
with pharmaceutical representatives.  As there appears to be a vacuum in this
area of education, making a simple improvement to educate doctors makes
more sense than shifting the corporate regulatory structure that may ultimately
reduce the pharmaceutical industry’s incentive to provide valuable information
to physicians for treating patients.
As pharmaceutical corporations operate with a motive to make profit, they
are in a poor position to make business decisions based on patient interests.
Focusing on physician education would allow pharmaceutical corporations to
maximize their duties to their shareholders because potential liability regarding
physicians’ patients would not constrain their conduct.  Therefore, the pharma-
ceutical regulatory system would not have to sacrifice the interests of patients
in the process.
Alternatively, the Legislature should define a pharmaceutical corpora-
tion’s duties to other constituencies in detail for purposes of transparency and
predictability.  At the very least, pharmaceutical corporations would be able to
understand the full requirements of the law, and how the Legislature will
impose liability.  Although this alternative solution is unattractive, it is better
than the current answer.
V. CONCLUSION
Government regulation of pharmaceutical companies has wrestled with the
conflicting influences of the classical model of corporate governance and the
modern approach to corporate decision-making.  The classical model empha-
sizes the corporation’s duties to its shareholders, holding that directors and
officers should take actions solely to maximize shareholder profitability.  The
modern approach, however, focuses on the corporation’s duties to external par-
ties and obligates pharmaceutical corporations to act in the best interests of
outside constituents, such as patients.
NRS section 639.570 complies with the modern approach, thereby reduc-
ing a pharmaceutical corporation’s ability to maximize profits for its sharehold-
155 See Manchanda & Honka, supra note 4, at 793.
156 Susan L. Coyle, Physician-Industry Relations.  Part 1:  Individual Physicians, 136
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 396, 397 (2002).
157 Id. at 398.
158 Id.
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ers.159  By forcing the corporations to act in the best interests of patients, and
not to interfere with the independent judgment of healthcare professionals, the
Legislature has created an overly vague and burdensome requirement.  Further-
more, the purported benefits of the legislation, namely a decrease in pharma-
ceutical costs, are both unproven and uncertain.  The legislation provides an
unclear solution to a perceived problem by changing the fundamental nature of
corporate governance in the pharmaceutical industry.  The Legislature should
not take such drastic action in these circumstances.
Instead, the Nevada Legislature should restore the application of NRS sec-
tion 78.138 to control the activities of pharmaceutical corporations.  The State
should place greater focus on improving educational opportunities for health-
care professionals to learn how to interact with pharmaceutical professionals.
To be sure, this recommendation places an additional burden on healthcare pro-
fessionals to learn how to interact with the pharmaceutical industry.  The high
duty placed on physicians to pursue the best interests of their patients makes
them ideal candidates for controlling the flow of information as well as interac-
tions between them and pharmaceutical representatives.
In the alternative, the Legislature should at least further define the regula-
tory limits of NRS section 639.570.  The current legislation does not specifi-
cally define acceptable marketing conduct, and therefore reduces regulatory
transparency.  As a result, pharmaceutical corporations are unable to ascertain
the scope of liability regarding third parties, and thus, must act in an overly
cautious manner to avoid liability.  This lack of information creates unneeded
costs.  By explaining the scope of liability, the Legislature can at least avoid
this conflict and allow pharmaceutical corporations to fashion a regulatory
scheme that is in line with the concerns of the public.
159 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 639.570 (2007).
